Assignment Prompt & Instructions
instructions and readings attached
– ## week9.pdf
– ## 511Excerpt.pdf
– TurningtheTablesText.pdf
**## week9.pdf**
Answer the following questions
1. Have you had personal negotiations experience in which you either did or did not
adequately prepare? Explain.
2. You will be leading collective bargaining for a union of nursing home workers at a
large nursing home in San Francisco. Please tell us the first three (most
important) steps you will take. Why are these the most important?
3. Based on this week’s lecture and readings etc., compare the approaches to
bargaining preparation. Are there differences? Explain.
Reference:
https://mronline.org/2014/04/05/rachleff050414-html-2/
[https://mronline.org/2014/04/05/rachleff050414-html-2/](https://mronline.org/2014/04/05/rachleff050414-html-2/)
**## 511Excerpt.pdf**
Cornell University Press
ILR Press
Chapter Title: The Negotiations Process and Strikes
Book Title: An Introduction to U.S. Collective Bargaining and Labor Relations
Book Author(s): Harry C. Katz, Thomas A. Kochan and Alexander J. S. Colvin
Published by: Cornell University Press, ILR Press. (2017)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1vjqr3z.13
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Cornell University Press, ILR Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to An Introduction to U.S. Collective Bargaining and Labor Relations
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200 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations
Thus, management has tried to shift away from factors such as wages in the
industry or increases in the cost of living and toward the fi rm ’ s ability to pay.
Internal Comparisons
Every negotiation is carefully watched by a fi rm ’ s other employees. Management
must consider how a wage settlement might infl uence the expectations and
demands of other employees in the fi rm regardless of whether those employees
are represented by unions. Management, for example, often considers whether
wage increases for unionized hourly workers will lead to pay increases for supervisors
and other white-collar employees outside the bargaining unit. One reason manage-
ment give pay increases to white-collar employees is such increases weaken these
employees’ potential attraction to unionization.
The Dynamics of Management ’ s Decision-Making Process
So far we have painted a rather static picture of management ’ s decision making.
Yet the actual process of decision making over the course of a bargaining cycle
(from the pre-negotiation planning stage to the signing of the fi nal agreement)
is a dynamic one. The process is replete with ambiguities over who has the
authority to set policies, confl icts among decision makers over the appropriate
weight to be attached to different goals, and power struggles among competing
decision makers.
The process by which management establishes bargaining strategies involves
extensive intraorganizational bargaining that is every bit as intense as the bargaining
between the union and management. Because the successful resolution of internal
differences is a prerequisite to a smoothly functioning bargaining process, it is
important to understand how fi rms prepare for negotiations.
To provide a more complete picture of how management prepares for collective
bargaining, Box 8.2 describes a typical case. This fi rm is preparing to negotiate
a contract with the major bargaining unit in its largest manufacturing facility.
The contract traditionally sets the pattern for the economic settlements with
several smaller units at other locations.
Before negotiations (or very early in negotiations), the labor relations staff tries
to predict as closely as possible what it will take to get a settlement. But ultimately
the staff is ready at all times to revise its estimates based on new or better information
about the union ’ s position as the negotiations proceed.
The case in Box 8.2 illustrates the diversity of interests that exists in the different
levels of any modern company. It shows that the development of a company
strategy for negotiations is a highly political process, one in which the different
goals of various groups must ultimately be accommodated. Although the labor
relations staff serves as a key participant in the development of the strategy, the
concerns of operating management, fi nancial staff, and other interest groups in
the corporation are also integral to any fi nal decision.
It is interesting to examine how preparations for traditional negotiations compare
to preparation for an interest-based bargaining process. Box 8.3 draws on the
experiences of the same fi rm as it prepared for a recent round of interest-based
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Diane Frey
Start Here
Diane Frey
Diane Frey
The Negotiations Process and Strikes 201
BOX 8.2
Management ’ s Preparations for Negotiations in a Typical Firm
Stage One: Input from the Plants
The fi rst step in the process of preparing for negotiations takes place at the
plant level. 7 The plant labor relations staff holds meetings with plant supervisors
to discuss problems they have experienced in administering the existing
contract. From these discussions, the staff compiles a list of suggested contract
changes. At the same time, the staff also conducts a systematic review of
the grievances that have arisen under the current contract and collects
information on local labor market conditions and on the wages in other
fi rms in the community.
The staff then holds a meeting with the plant manager, who raises the
industrial relations problems the company has confronted in the plant. The
concerns of management are classifi ed into two groups: contractual problems
and problems that should be addressed outside the negotiating process.
In addition, the staff asks the plant manager to rank suggested contract
changes based on their potential for making a signifi cant improvement in
plant operations.
Stage Two: Input from Higher Levels of the Firm
Next, a series of meetings is held at the division level that involves the
division labor relations staff, operations managers at the division level, and
the corporate labor relations director and staff. From time to time, outside
industrial relations consultants sit in on these division-level meetings. Here
the concerns of the various plants are evaluated against two criteria: (1) the
operational benefi ts expected from proposed contract changes; and (2) the
likelihood that the desired changes can be achieved in the negotiations
process.
The corporate labor relations staff plays a vital role in these division-level
discussions, since the expected benefi ts of different contractual changes can
be a matter of dispute across the various plants. In addition, the division
labor relations staff is responsible for carefully examining the contract language
that exists in the various local agreements for inconsistencies or problems
that could be removed by clauses that refl ect corporate labor relations
preferences. Sometimes the plant labor relations representatives object to
changes suggested at the division level because they do not correspond to
the priorities of the plant offi cials and because the existing “discrepancies”
may be serving a useful purpose in the plant.
The corporate labor relations staff works closely with the vice-president
for fi nance to develop wage targets. Information on plant labor costs,
corporate earnings, and the long-term fi nancial prospects of the company
and the industry are built into the wage target the corporate staff ultimately
recommends.
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202 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations
Stage Three: Input from Research
A research subgroup in the labor relations staff of the company also conducts
background research that is used in management ’ s preparations for negotiations.
At least a year and a half before the opening of formal negotiations, the
research staff begins to prepare the background information necessary for
developing the company ’ s proposals.
The researchers use a database on the demographic characteristics of
employees and analyze personnel statistics such as turnover, absentee, and
grievance rates. They also monitor internal union developments, specifi cally
resolutions the union has passed at its conventions, union publications, and
union leaders’ statements about the upcoming negotiations. In addition, they
survey plant managers for their views on their relations with the union and
the problems they would like to see addressed in the negotiations. The staff
also consults plant labor relations staff members to obtain their suggestions.
This fi rm probably invests more resources and assigns more authority for
bargaining preparation to its research staff than do most other corporations.
The research staff is ultimately responsible for putting together a summary
report that goes to the vice-president of industrial relations and the corporate
director of compensation. These executives then work with the manager
of the research and planning department to develop targets for bargaining.
Stage Four: Final Preparations
The fi nal step in management ’ s preparation for negotiations is a meeting
that includes the corporate labor relations staff, the chief executive offi cer,
and the board of directors. At this meeting, the corporate labor relations
director presents the proposed wage targets and other proposed contract
changes for board approval and states the reasons for seeking the proposed
changes. Sometimes this meeting does not take place until after the fi rst
negotiations session with the union. The industrial relations director might
prefer to wait until then because it may be useful to hear from the union
before he or she makes a fi nal recommendation to top management. This
helps the industrial relations director identify the relative importance the
union is likely to give to pay issues and the intensity of the union ’ s concern
about other areas of the contract.
One labor relations director described to us how he presents his recom-
mendation to top management in this way:
I always number my proposed target settlements as proposed settlement target
number 1. Someone once asked me what that meant. I said that this is what I
think it will take to get a settlement but I number it because I may have to
come back to you at some point with my proposed settlement number 2 or
even my proposed settlement number 3, et cetera.
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204 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations
We still had discipline at the table. We had chief spokespersons. In fact,
we got very upset and disappointed when at one point the process broke
down. When we started talking about overtime, we had already done some
joint staff work looking at some pilot programs we had started in a couple
of settings to let the union handle how overtime is distributed. This is
always a big problem and headache for management, and [it is] a costly
issue. The staff had pretty much agreed privately to extend the pilot approach
to the whole bargaining unit, but when the issue came up for discussion,
the manufacturing representative on our team said: “We ’ d never agree to
that!” We read him the riot act later in private for springing this on us, but
it essentially killed discussion of this issue, and we never did get the job
done on this issue.
As we got into the tough economic issues, bargaining took on more
traditional features. These were very tough and the union leaders needed
to be able to demonstrate to their constituents [that] they squeezed us as
hard as they could to get the best deal possible. We understood this.
Still, there was better communications, and we never worked past 8 p.m.
bargaining. While much of the background research and information gathering
is similar, some of this is done jointly with the union. In this case, the problem-
solving processes that had been put in place in the company-union relationship
at the workplace provided the foundation for taking a problem-solving approach
to negotiations.
UNIONS’ AND WORKERS’ PREPARATIONS FOR
NEGOTIATIONS
This section reviews the common procedures unions and workers follow during
the negotiation of a collective bargaining contract. This material parallels the
discussion of the procedures used by management in preparing for negotiations
described above.
The Role of the Union Negotiating Committee
The union is represented by a negotiating committee in negotiations with manage-
ment. The makeup of the union negotiating committee varies across unions,
although it typically includes some union offi cers, support staff (such as members
of the local or the national union ’ s research staff or both), and elected worker
representatives. Often the leaders of the union ’ s negotiating committee are the
highest elected offi cers of the union that is covered by the collective bargaining
agreement under negotiation. Some unions, such as local construction, hotel and
restaurant, or trucking unions, tend to rely on hired business agents to lead their
negotiations.
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Diane Frey
Diane Frey
The Negotiations Process and Strikes 205
The negotiating committee will meet several times before the start of negotia-
tions to formulate the union ’ s list of demands and to begin to establish expecta-
tions about what the union can win in negotiations. Before these meetings,
the negotiating committee will solicit demands from union members, either
directly through meetings called to discuss the upcoming negotiations or through
polls. In the UAW, for example, elected representatives from the local unions
meet in a convention and vote on bargaining resolutions during preparations for
companywide bargaining. The UAW leadership also consults union members
during the negotiation of plant contracts that supplement the companywide
agreements.
A union negotiating committee typically also receives information and
advice from the national union ’ s research staff during its preparations for
bargaining. The information provided frequently covers the fi nancial perfor-
mance of the company, forecasts the future performance of the company and
the economy, and summarizes recent settlements in other unions or the pay
improvements unorganized workers in the same city, fi rm, or industry have
received.
Some unions, such as the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), do extensive
research and analysis of economic developments in their industry and of the
fi nancial situation of each company. Prior to entering negotiations, the ALPA
research staff conducts extensive briefi ngs with the bargaining committee of an
airline and in some cases, such as at Continental Airlines, meets with company
representatives to compare fi nancial data and analysis. It is not uncommon for
union and company research staff to share information with each other if for no
other reason than to avoid debates over some of the basic facts each side needs
to prepare their team for negotiations.
Many unions now use surveys, focus groups, and/or direct interviews with
rank-and-fi le members to gather information about their concerns and their priorities
for negotiations. This serves as a two-way communications process. It both provides
data on the priorities of rank-and-fi le members and begins to engage the rank
and fi le in the negotiations process by informing them of some of the issues that
may come up.
Acquisition of Strike Authorization If an Impasse
Is Reached
If the union comes to an impasse with management during the negotiations and
is considering going on strike over unresolved disputes, two steps occur. In local
contract negotiations, the union ’ s constitution typically requires the local to seek
strike authorization from the national union. Strike approval is an important
process because, among other things, it enables striking workers to receive strike
benefi ts from the national union ’ s strike fund.
A union considering a strike will also typically poll its members. The strike
vote serves a dual purpose: it tells the union leadership whether the union ’ s
members support such an action and it helps rally the workers around the purpose
of the strike.
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Diane Frey
206 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations
Contract Ratifi cation
When an agreement is reached between the union ’ s negotiating committee and
management ’ s representatives, the union proceeds through its contract ratifi cation
procedures. Here there is much variation in the exact procedures unions use.
The fi rst step some unions take is to send a proposed agreement to a council
made up of lower-level union offi cers. This council includes local union offi cers
when a companywide agreement is negotiated (as in the steel and auto industries).
Union constitutions typically also require that the workers covered by a negotiated
agreement vote on any proposed settlement.
There are some notable exceptions to the normal pattern of union members
voting on proposed contracts. But in the usual case, workers must approve contract
settlements, often by majority vote. This sort of voting is an example of participatory
democracy in this critical aspect of union decision making.
The Role of Union Leaders in Shaping Strategies
The actual bargaining demands of unions refl ect more than just an averaging of
their members’ preferences. Several factors combine to produce the complex
process by which union leaders arrive at their bargaining objectives.
First, in addition to considering the preferences of their members, union leaders
must evaluate how likely it is that objectives can be attained. Unrealistic goals
must be discarded during pre-negotiation planning sessions or early on in
negotiations.
Second, union leaders must take into account the varying political infl uence
of subgroups within the union. Older or more skilled workers, for example, may
be more politically infl uential than other members. Thus, the objectives leaders
ultimately select may refl ect some workers’ goals more than others.
Third, union leaders must also be concerned about the long-term survival of
the union and must take steps to preserve those interests. However, there is always
the risk that union leaders will emphasize union security at the expense of
member preferences.
Finally, a central job for union leaders, like all leaders, is to lead! Union leaders
must weigh strategic options, make decisions, and secure the ongoing support of
their members for the decisions they make.
One of the keys to union leadership is effective internal communication. Union
leaders need regular upward communication from the rank and fi le and from
local union offi cers. Effective union leadership also requires that decision makers
communicate their activities and decisions back to the members. Unions use such
techniques as opinion surveys, satellite hookups, television advertising, and the
Internet to communicate with their members. Indeed, the Internet is becoming
a key resource in bargaining today. Union leaders are learning that they must
develop the skill to use this tool to communicate with members, for it is certain
that rival groups in the union will have those skills. In one case, ALPA found
that the tentative wage agreement it had reached with Delta Airlines was criticized
on a rival group ’ s website before the union team could even describe its terms
to union members! Thus, the means of communication in unions and the role
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Diane Frey
Diane Frey
The Negotiations Process and Strikes 207
of communications in negotiations in general are changing rapidly in the age of
the Internet.
THE CYCLE OF TRADITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
Negotiations often proceed through a cycle in which the four subprocesses of
bargaining emerge and interrelate. 8 A typical cycle for a traditional negotiations
process is described below.
The Early Stages
In the initial stage of a traditional negotiation, the parties present their opening
proposals. This stage often involves a larger number of people than will be involved
in the negotiations of the fi nal agreement. The union, for example, may bring
in representatives from various interest groups and several levels of the union
hierarchy. These people participate in developing the initial proposals and later
become involved in securing ratifi cation of any agreement. The involvement of
all these different representatives can smooth the process of intraorganizational
bargaining in the union.
The union then presents proposals that cover the entire range of its concerns.
Some of the proposals will be of critical importance and will be at the heart of
the discussions as the strike deadline approaches. Some are important but may
be traded off at the last minute. Some may be translated into more specifi c
demands at a later stage of bargaining or may be issues to which the union will
assign a high priority in some future round of negotiations. Other issues are of
low priority and will be dropped as negotiations proceed into the serious decision-
making stages.
The Presentation of a Laundry List
The union ’ s presentation of a laundry list of issues serves several purposes. It
allows union leaders to recognize different interest groups by at least mentioning
their proposals. Some unrealistic demands will be aired, the problems underlying
these demands can be explored, and the employer can then reject these demands.
This process takes the pressure off union offi cers who might otherwise appear to
have arbitrarily nixed some group ’ s pet proposal. In a laundry list, either side also
could introduce issues that it hopes will be pursued in future negotiations.
Presenting a long list of proposals and infl ated demands as a fi rst step might
also be a useful way to camoufl age the real priorities of the union. Or a long list
of proposals could be helpful in integrative bargaining by facilitating trades across
issues.
Behavior of the Employer in the Early Phase
The behavior of employers at the outset of bargaining varies considerably. Some
employers will present a set of proposals to counterbalance the union demands.
Other employers will receive the union demands and promise a response at a
future negotiating session. Many management representatives prefer to delay
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Diane Frey
Diane Frey
**TurningtheTablesText.pdf**
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**TurningtheTablesText.pdf**
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**## week9.pdf**
Answer the following questions
1. Have you had personal negotiations experience in which you either did or did not
adequately prepare? Explain.
2. You will be leading collective bargaining for a union of nursing home workers at a
large nursing home in San Francisco. Please tell us the first three (most
important) steps you will take. Why are these the most important?
3. Based on this week’s lecture and readings etc., compare the approaches to
bargaining preparation. Are there differences? Explain.
Reference:
https://mronline.org/2014/04/05/rachleff050414-html-2/
[https://mronline.org/2014/04/05/rachleff050414-html-2/](https://mronline.org/2014/04/05/rachleff050414-html-2/)
**## 511Excerpt.pdf**
Cornell University Press
ILR Press
Chapter Title: The Negotiations Process and Strikes
Book Title: An Introduction to U.S. Collective Bargaining and Labor Relations
Book Author(s): Harry C. Katz, Thomas A. Kochan and Alexander J. S. Colvin
Published by: Cornell University Press, ILR Press. (2017)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1vjqr3z.13
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Cornell University Press, ILR Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to An Introduction to U.S. Collective Bargaining and Labor Relations
This content downloaded from 130.212.18.96 on Tue, 19 Jun 2018 14:02:03 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
200 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations
Thus, management has tried to shift away from factors such as wages in the
industry or increases in the cost of living and toward the fi rm ’ s ability to pay.
Internal Comparisons
Every negotiation is carefully watched by a fi rm ’ s other employees. Management
must consider how a wage settlement might infl uence the expectations and
demands of other employees in the fi rm regardless of whether those employees
are represented by unions. Management, for example, often considers whether
wage increases for unionized hourly workers will lead to pay increases for supervisors
and other white-collar employees outside the bargaining unit. One reason manage-
ment give pay increases to white-collar employees is such increases weaken these
employees’ potential attraction to unionization.
The Dynamics of Management ’ s Decision-Making Process
So far we have painted a rather static picture of management ’ s decision making.
Yet the actual process of decision making over the course of a bargaining cycle
(from the pre-negotiation planning stage to the signing of the fi nal agreement)
is a dynamic one. The process is replete with ambiguities over who has the
authority to set policies, confl icts among decision makers over the appropriate
weight to be attached to different goals, and power struggles among competing
decision makers.
The process by which management establishes bargaining strategies involves
extensive intraorganizational bargaining that is every bit as intense as the bargaining
between the union and management. Because the successful resolution of internal
differences is a prerequisite to a smoothly functioning bargaining process, it is
important to understand how fi rms prepare for negotiations.
To provide a more complete picture of how management prepares for collective
bargaining, Box 8.2 describes a typical case. This fi rm is preparing to negotiate
a contract with the major bargaining unit in its largest manufacturing facility.
The contract traditionally sets the pattern for the economic settlements with
several smaller units at other locations.
Before negotiations (or very early in negotiations), the labor relations staff tries
to predict as closely as possible what it will take to get a settlement. But ultimately
the staff is ready at all times to revise its estimates based on new or better information
about the union ’ s position as the negotiations proceed.
The case in Box 8.2 illustrates the diversity of interests that exists in the different
levels of any modern company. It shows that the development of a company
strategy for negotiations is a highly political process, one in which the different
goals of various groups must ultimately be accommodated. Although the labor
relations staff serves as a key participant in the development of the strategy, the
concerns of operating management, fi nancial staff, and other interest groups in
the corporation are also integral to any fi nal decision.
It is interesting to examine how preparations for traditional negotiations compare
to preparation for an interest-based bargaining process. Box 8.3 draws on the
experiences of the same fi rm as it prepared for a recent round of interest-based
This content downloaded from 130.212.18.96 on Tue, 19 Jun 2018 14:02:03 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Diane Frey
Start Here
Diane Frey
Diane Frey
The Negotiations Process and Strikes 201
BOX 8.2
Management ’ s Preparations for Negotiations in a Typical Firm
Stage One: Input from the Plants
The fi rst step in the process of preparing for negotiations takes place at the
plant level. 7 The plant labor relations staff holds meetings with plant supervisors
to discuss problems they have experienced in administering the existing
contract. From these discussions, the staff compiles a list of suggested contract
changes. At the same time, the staff also conducts a systematic review of
the grievances that have arisen under the current contract and collects
information on local labor market conditions and on the wages in other
fi rms in the community.
The staff then holds a meeting with the plant manager, who raises the
industrial relations problems the company has confronted in the plant. The
concerns of management are classifi ed into two groups: contractual problems
and problems that should be addressed outside the negotiating process.
In addition, the staff asks the plant manager to rank suggested contract
changes based on their potential for making a signifi cant improvement in
plant operations.
Stage Two: Input from Higher Levels of the Firm
Next, a series of meetings is held at the division level that involves the
division labor relations staff, operations managers at the division level, and
the corporate labor relations director and staff. From time to time, outside
industrial relations consultants sit in on these division-level meetings. Here
the concerns of the various plants are evaluated against two criteria: (1) the
operational benefi ts expected from proposed contract changes; and (2) the
likelihood that the desired changes can be achieved in the negotiations
process.
The corporate labor relations staff plays a vital role in these division-level
discussions, since the expected benefi ts of different contractual changes can
be a matter of dispute across the various plants. In addition, the division
labor relations staff is responsible for carefully examining the contract language
that exists in the various local agreements for inconsistencies or problems
that could be removed by clauses that refl ect corporate labor relations
preferences. Sometimes the plant labor relations representatives object to
changes suggested at the division level because they do not correspond to
the priorities of the plant offi cials and because the existing “discrepancies”
may be serving a useful purpose in the plant.
The corporate labor relations staff works closely with the vice-president
for fi nance to develop wage targets. Information on plant labor costs,
corporate earnings, and the long-term fi nancial prospects of the company
and the industry are built into the wage target the corporate staff ultimately
recommends.
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202 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations
Stage Three: Input from Research
A research subgroup in the labor relations staff of the company also conducts
background research that is used in management ’ s preparations for negotiations.
At least a year and a half before the opening of formal negotiations, the
research staff begins to prepare the background information necessary for
developing the company ’ s proposals.
The researchers use a database on the demographic characteristics of
employees and analyze personnel statistics such as turnover, absentee, and
grievance rates. They also monitor internal union developments, specifi cally
resolutions the union has passed at its conventions, union publications, and
union leaders’ statements about the upcoming negotiations. In addition, they
survey plant managers for their views on their relations with the union and
the problems they would like to see addressed in the negotiations. The staff
also consults plant labor relations staff members to obtain their suggestions.
This fi rm probably invests more resources and assigns more authority for
bargaining preparation to its research staff than do most other corporations.
The research staff is ultimately responsible for putting together a summary
report that goes to the vice-president of industrial relations and the corporate
director of compensation. These executives then work with the manager
of the research and planning department to develop targets for bargaining.
Stage Four: Final Preparations
The fi nal step in management ’ s preparation for negotiations is a meeting
that includes the corporate labor relations staff, the chief executive offi cer,
and the board of directors. At this meeting, the corporate labor relations
director presents the proposed wage targets and other proposed contract
changes for board approval and states the reasons for seeking the proposed
changes. Sometimes this meeting does not take place until after the fi rst
negotiations session with the union. The industrial relations director might
prefer to wait until then because it may be useful to hear from the union
before he or she makes a fi nal recommendation to top management. This
helps the industrial relations director identify the relative importance the
union is likely to give to pay issues and the intensity of the union ’ s concern
about other areas of the contract.
One labor relations director described to us how he presents his recom-
mendation to top management in this way:
I always number my proposed target settlements as proposed settlement target
number 1. Someone once asked me what that meant. I said that this is what I
think it will take to get a settlement but I number it because I may have to
come back to you at some point with my proposed settlement number 2 or
even my proposed settlement number 3, et cetera.
This content downloaded from 130.212.18.96 on Tue, 19 Jun 2018 14:02:03 UTC
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204 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations
We still had discipline at the table. We had chief spokespersons. In fact,
we got very upset and disappointed when at one point the process broke
down. When we started talking about overtime, we had already done some
joint staff work looking at some pilot programs we had started in a couple
of settings to let the union handle how overtime is distributed. This is
always a big problem and headache for management, and [it is] a costly
issue. The staff had pretty much agreed privately to extend the pilot approach
to the whole bargaining unit, but when the issue came up for discussion,
the manufacturing representative on our team said: “We ’ d never agree to
that!” We read him the riot act later in private for springing this on us, but
it essentially killed discussion of this issue, and we never did get the job
done on this issue.
As we got into the tough economic issues, bargaining took on more
traditional features. These were very tough and the union leaders needed
to be able to demonstrate to their constituents [that] they squeezed us as
hard as they could to get the best deal possible. We understood this.
Still, there was better communications, and we never worked past 8 p.m.
bargaining. While much of the background research and information gathering
is similar, some of this is done jointly with the union. In this case, the problem-
solving processes that had been put in place in the company-union relationship
at the workplace provided the foundation for taking a problem-solving approach
to negotiations.
UNIONS’ AND WORKERS’ PREPARATIONS FOR
NEGOTIATIONS
This section reviews the common procedures unions and workers follow during
the negotiation of a collective bargaining contract. This material parallels the
discussion of the procedures used by management in preparing for negotiations
described above.
The Role of the Union Negotiating Committee
The union is represented by a negotiating committee in negotiations with manage-
ment. The makeup of the union negotiating committee varies across unions,
although it typically includes some union offi cers, support staff (such as members
of the local or the national union ’ s research staff or both), and elected worker
representatives. Often the leaders of the union ’ s negotiating committee are the
highest elected offi cers of the union that is covered by the collective bargaining
agreement under negotiation. Some unions, such as local construction, hotel and
restaurant, or trucking unions, tend to rely on hired business agents to lead their
negotiations.
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Diane Frey
The Negotiations Process and Strikes 205
The negotiating committee will meet several times before the start of negotia-
tions to formulate the union ’ s list of demands and to begin to establish expecta-
tions about what the union can win in negotiations. Before these meetings,
the negotiating committee will solicit demands from union members, either
directly through meetings called to discuss the upcoming negotiations or through
polls. In the UAW, for example, elected representatives from the local unions
meet in a convention and vote on bargaining resolutions during preparations for
companywide bargaining. The UAW leadership also consults union members
during the negotiation of plant contracts that supplement the companywide
agreements.
A union negotiating committee typically also receives information and
advice from the national union ’ s research staff during its preparations for
bargaining. The information provided frequently covers the fi nancial perfor-
mance of the company, forecasts the future performance of the company and
the economy, and summarizes recent settlements in other unions or the pay
improvements unorganized workers in the same city, fi rm, or industry have
received.
Some unions, such as the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), do extensive
research and analysis of economic developments in their industry and of the
fi nancial situation of each company. Prior to entering negotiations, the ALPA
research staff conducts extensive briefi ngs with the bargaining committee of an
airline and in some cases, such as at Continental Airlines, meets with company
representatives to compare fi nancial data and analysis. It is not uncommon for
union and company research staff to share information with each other if for no
other reason than to avoid debates over some of the basic facts each side needs
to prepare their team for negotiations.
Many unions now use surveys, focus groups, and/or direct interviews with
rank-and-fi le members to gather information about their concerns and their priorities
for negotiations. This serves as a two-way communications process. It both provides
data on the priorities of rank-and-fi le members and begins to engage the rank
and fi le in the negotiations process by informing them of some of the issues that
may come up.
Acquisition of Strike Authorization If an Impasse
Is Reached
If the union comes to an impasse with management during the negotiations and
is considering going on strike over unresolved disputes, two steps occur. In local
contract negotiations, the union ’ s constitution typically requires the local to seek
strike authorization from the national union. Strike approval is an important
process because, among other things, it enables striking workers to receive strike
benefi ts from the national union ’ s strike fund.
A union considering a strike will also typically poll its members. The strike
vote serves a dual purpose: it tells the union leadership whether the union ’ s
members support such an action and it helps rally the workers around the purpose
of the strike.
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Diane Frey
206 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations
Contract Ratifi cation
When an agreement is reached between the union ’ s negotiating committee and
management ’ s representatives, the union proceeds through its contract ratifi cation
procedures. Here there is much variation in the exact procedures unions use.
The fi rst step some unions take is to send a proposed agreement to a council
made up of lower-level union offi cers. This council includes local union offi cers
when a companywide agreement is negotiated (as in the steel and auto industries).
Union constitutions typically also require that the workers covered by a negotiated
agreement vote on any proposed settlement.
There are some notable exceptions to the normal pattern of union members
voting on proposed contracts. But in the usual case, workers must approve contract
settlements, often by majority vote. This sort of voting is an example of participatory
democracy in this critical aspect of union decision making.
The Role of Union Leaders in Shaping Strategies
The actual bargaining demands of unions refl ect more than just an averaging of
their members’ preferences. Several factors combine to produce the complex
process by which union leaders arrive at their bargaining objectives.
First, in addition to considering the preferences of their members, union leaders
must evaluate how likely it is that objectives can be attained. Unrealistic goals
must be discarded during pre-negotiation planning sessions or early on in
negotiations.
Second, union leaders must take into account the varying political infl uence
of subgroups within the union. Older or more skilled workers, for example, may
be more politically infl uential than other members. Thus, the objectives leaders
ultimately select may refl ect some workers’ goals more than others.
Third, union leaders must also be concerned about the long-term survival of
the union and must take steps to preserve those interests. However, there is always
the risk that union leaders will emphasize union security at the expense of
member preferences.
Finally, a central job for union leaders, like all leaders, is to lead! Union leaders
must weigh strategic options, make decisions, and secure the ongoing support of
their members for the decisions they make.
One of the keys to union leadership is effective internal communication. Union
leaders need regular upward communication from the rank and fi le and from
local union offi cers. Effective union leadership also requires that decision makers
communicate their activities and decisions back to the members. Unions use such
techniques as opinion surveys, satellite hookups, television advertising, and the
Internet to communicate with their members. Indeed, the Internet is becoming
a key resource in bargaining today. Union leaders are learning that they must
develop the skill to use this tool to communicate with members, for it is certain
that rival groups in the union will have those skills. In one case, ALPA found
that the tentative wage agreement it had reached with Delta Airlines was criticized
on a rival group ’ s website before the union team could even describe its terms
to union members! Thus, the means of communication in unions and the role
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Diane Frey
Diane Frey
The Negotiations Process and Strikes 207
of communications in negotiations in general are changing rapidly in the age of
the Internet.
THE CYCLE OF TRADITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
Negotiations often proceed through a cycle in which the four subprocesses of
bargaining emerge and interrelate. 8 A typical cycle for a traditional negotiations
process is described below.
The Early Stages
In the initial stage of a traditional negotiation, the parties present their opening
proposals. This stage often involves a larger number of people than will be involved
in the negotiations of the fi nal agreement. The union, for example, may bring
in representatives from various interest groups and several levels of the union
hierarchy. These people participate in developing the initial proposals and later
become involved in securing ratifi cation of any agreement. The involvement of
all these different representatives can smooth the process of intraorganizational
bargaining in the union.
The union then presents proposals that cover the entire range of its concerns.
Some of the proposals will be of critical importance and will be at the heart of
the discussions as the strike deadline approaches. Some are important but may
be traded off at the last minute. Some may be translated into more specifi c
demands at a later stage of bargaining or may be issues to which the union will
assign a high priority in some future round of negotiations. Other issues are of
low priority and will be dropped as negotiations proceed into the serious decision-
making stages.
The Presentation of a Laundry List
The union ’ s presentation of a laundry list of issues serves several purposes. It
allows union leaders to recognize different interest groups by at least mentioning
their proposals. Some unrealistic demands will be aired, the problems underlying
these demands can be explored, and the employer can then reject these demands.
This process takes the pressure off union offi cers who might otherwise appear to
have arbitrarily nixed some group ’ s pet proposal. In a laundry list, either side also
could introduce issues that it hopes will be pursued in future negotiations.
Presenting a long list of proposals and infl ated demands as a fi rst step might
also be a useful way to camoufl age the real priorities of the union. Or a long list
of proposals could be helpful in integrative bargaining by facilitating trades across
issues.
Behavior of the Employer in the Early Phase
The behavior of employers at the outset of bargaining varies considerably. Some
employers will present a set of proposals to counterbalance the union demands.
Other employers will receive the union demands and promise a response at a
future negotiating session. Many management representatives prefer to delay
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Diane Frey
Diane Frey
**TurningtheTablesText.pdf**
This file is too large to display. [View in new window](https://www.sweetstudy.com/files/turningthetablestext-pdf)
**## week9.pdf**
Answer the following questions
1. Have you had personal negotiations experience in which you either did or did not
adequately prepare? Explain.
2. You will be leading collective bargaining for a union of nursing home workers at a
large nursing home in San Francisco. Please tell us the first three (most
important) steps you will take. Why are these the most important?
3. Based on this week’s lecture and readings etc., compare the approaches to
bargaining preparation. Are there differences? Explain.
Reference:
https://mronline.org/2014/04/05/rachleff050414-html-2/
[https://mronline.org/2014/04/05/rachleff050414-html-2/](https://mronline.org/2014/04/05/rachleff050414-html-2/)
**## 511Excerpt.pdf**
Cornell University Press
ILR Press
Chapter Title: The Negotiations Process and Strikes
Book Title: An Introduction to U.S. Collective Bargaining and Labor Relations
Book Author(s): Harry C. Katz, Thomas A. Kochan and Alexander J. S. Colvin
Published by: Cornell University Press, ILR Press. (2017)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1vjqr3z.13
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200 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations
Thus, management has tried to shift away from factors such as wages in the
industry or increases in the cost of living and toward the fi rm ’ s ability to pay.
Internal Comparisons
Every negotiation is carefully watched by a fi rm ’ s other employees. Management
must consider how a wage settlement might infl uence the expectations and
demands of other employees in the fi rm regardless of whether those employees
are represented by unions. Management, for example, often considers whether
wage increases for unionized hourly workers will lead to pay increases for supervisors
and other white-collar employees outside the bargaining unit. One reason manage-
ment give pay increases to white-collar employees is such increases weaken these
employees’ potential attraction to unionization.
The Dynamics of Management ’ s Decision-Making Process
So far we have painted a rather static picture of management ’ s decision making.
Yet the actual process of decision making over the course of a bargaining cycle
(from the pre-negotiation planning stage to the signing of the fi nal agreement)
is a dynamic one. The process is replete with ambiguities over who has the
authority to set policies, confl icts among decision makers over the appropriate
weight to be attached to different goals, and power struggles among competing
decision makers.
The process by which management establishes bargaining strategies involves
extensive intraorganizational bargaining that is every bit as intense as the bargaining
between the union and management. Because the successful resolution of internal
differences is a prerequisite to a smoothly functioning bargaining process, it is
important to understand how fi rms prepare for negotiations.
To provide a more complete picture of how management prepares for collective
bargaining, Box 8.2 describes a typical case. This fi rm is preparing to negotiate
a contract with the major bargaining unit in its largest manufacturing facility.
The contract traditionally sets the pattern for the economic settlements with
several smaller units at other locations.
Before negotiations (or very early in negotiations), the labor relations staff tries
to predict as closely as possible what it will take to get a settlement. But ultimately
the staff is ready at all times to revise its estimates based on new or better information
about the union ’ s position as the negotiations proceed.
The case in Box 8.2 illustrates the diversity of interests that exists in the different
levels of any modern company. It shows that the development of a company
strategy for negotiations is a highly political process, one in which the different
goals of various groups must ultimately be accommodated. Although the labor
relations staff serves as a key participant in the development of the strategy, the
concerns of operating management, fi nancial staff, and other interest groups in
the corporation are also integral to any fi nal decision.
It is interesting to examine how preparations for traditional negotiations compare
to preparation for an interest-based bargaining process. Box 8.3 draws on the
experiences of the same fi rm as it prepared for a recent round of interest-based
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Diane Frey
Start Here
Diane Frey
Diane Frey
The Negotiations Process and Strikes 201
BOX 8.2
Management ’ s Preparations for Negotiations in a Typical Firm
Stage One: Input from the Plants
The fi rst step in the process of preparing for negotiations takes place at the
plant level. 7 The plant labor relations staff holds meetings with plant supervisors
to discuss problems they have experienced in administering the existing
contract. From these discussions, the staff compiles a list of suggested contract
changes. At the same time, the staff also conducts a systematic review of
the grievances that have arisen under the current contract and collects
information on local labor market conditions and on the wages in other
fi rms in the community.
The staff then holds a meeting with the plant manager, who raises the
industrial relations problems the company has confronted in the plant. The
concerns of management are classifi ed into two groups: contractual problems
and problems that should be addressed outside the negotiating process.
In addition, the staff asks the plant manager to rank suggested contract
changes based on their potential for making a signifi cant improvement in
plant operations.
Stage Two: Input from Higher Levels of the Firm
Next, a series of meetings is held at the division level that involves the
division labor relations staff, operations managers at the division level, and
the corporate labor relations director and staff. From time to time, outside
industrial relations consultants sit in on these division-level meetings. Here
the concerns of the various plants are evaluated against two criteria: (1) the
operational benefi ts expected from proposed contract changes; and (2) the
likelihood that the desired changes can be achieved in the negotiations
process.
The corporate labor relations staff plays a vital role in these division-level
discussions, since the expected benefi ts of different contractual changes can
be a matter of dispute across the various plants. In addition, the division
labor relations staff is responsible for carefully examining the contract language
that exists in the various local agreements for inconsistencies or problems
that could be removed by clauses that refl ect corporate labor relations
preferences. Sometimes the plant labor relations representatives object to
changes suggested at the division level because they do not correspond to
the priorities of the plant offi cials and because the existing “discrepancies”
may be serving a useful purpose in the plant.
The corporate labor relations staff works closely with the vice-president
for fi nance to develop wage targets. Information on plant labor costs,
corporate earnings, and the long-term fi nancial prospects of the company
and the industry are built into the wage target the corporate staff ultimately
recommends.
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202 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations
Stage Three: Input from Research
A research subgroup in the labor relations staff of the company also conducts
background research that is used in management ’ s preparations for negotiations.
At least a year and a half before the opening of formal negotiations, the
research staff begins to prepare the background information necessary for
developing the company ’ s proposals.
The researchers use a database on the demographic characteristics of
employees and analyze personnel statistics such as turnover, absentee, and
grievance rates. They also monitor internal union developments, specifi cally
resolutions the union has passed at its conventions, union publications, and
union leaders’ statements about the upcoming negotiations. In addition, they
survey plant managers for their views on their relations with the union and
the problems they would like to see addressed in the negotiations. The staff
also consults plant labor relations staff members to obtain their suggestions.
This fi rm probably invests more resources and assigns more authority for
bargaining preparation to its research staff than do most other corporations.
The research staff is ultimately responsible for putting together a summary
report that goes to the vice-president of industrial relations and the corporate
director of compensation. These executives then work with the manager
of the research and planning department to develop targets for bargaining.
Stage Four: Final Preparations
The fi nal step in management ’ s preparation for negotiations is a meeting
that includes the corporate labor relations staff, the chief executive offi cer,
and the board of directors. At this meeting, the corporate labor relations
director presents the proposed wage targets and other proposed contract
changes for board approval and states the reasons for seeking the proposed
changes. Sometimes this meeting does not take place until after the fi rst
negotiations session with the union. The industrial relations director might
prefer to wait until then because it may be useful to hear from the union
before he or she makes a fi nal recommendation to top management. This
helps the industrial relations director identify the relative importance the
union is likely to give to pay issues and the intensity of the union ’ s concern
about other areas of the contract.
One labor relations director described to us how he presents his recom-
mendation to top management in this way:
I always number my proposed target settlements as proposed settlement target
number 1. Someone once asked me what that meant. I said that this is what I
think it will take to get a settlement but I number it because I may have to
come back to you at some point with my proposed settlement number 2 or
even my proposed settlement number 3, et cetera.
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204 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations
We still had discipline at the table. We had chief spokespersons. In fact,
we got very upset and disappointed when at one point the process broke
down. When we started talking about overtime, we had already done some
joint staff work looking at some pilot programs we had started in a couple
of settings to let the union handle how overtime is distributed. This is
always a big problem and headache for management, and [it is] a costly
issue. The staff had pretty much agreed privately to extend the pilot approach
to the whole bargaining unit, but when the issue came up for discussion,
the manufacturing representative on our team said: “We ’ d never agree to
that!” We read him the riot act later in private for springing this on us, but
it essentially killed discussion of this issue, and we never did get the job
done on this issue.
As we got into the tough economic issues, bargaining took on more
traditional features. These were very tough and the union leaders needed
to be able to demonstrate to their constituents [that] they squeezed us as
hard as they could to get the best deal possible. We understood this.
Still, there was better communications, and we never worked past 8 p.m.
bargaining. While much of the background research and information gathering
is similar, some of this is done jointly with the union. In this case, the problem-
solving processes that had been put in place in the company-union relationship
at the workplace provided the foundation for taking a problem-solving approach
to negotiations.
UNIONS’ AND WORKERS’ PREPARATIONS FOR
NEGOTIATIONS
This section reviews the common procedures unions and workers follow during
the negotiation of a collective bargaining contract. This material parallels the
discussion of the procedures used by management in preparing for negotiations
described above.
The Role of the Union Negotiating Committee
The union is represented by a negotiating committee in negotiations with manage-
ment. The makeup of the union negotiating committee varies across unions,
although it typically includes some union offi cers, support staff (such as members
of the local or the national union ’ s research staff or both), and elected worker
representatives. Often the leaders of the union ’ s negotiating committee are the
highest elected offi cers of the union that is covered by the collective bargaining
agreement under negotiation. Some unions, such as local construction, hotel and
restaurant, or trucking unions, tend to rely on hired business agents to lead their
negotiations.
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Diane Frey
Diane Frey
The Negotiations Process and Strikes 205
The negotiating committee will meet several times before the start of negotia-
tions to formulate the union ’ s list of demands and to begin to establish expecta-
tions about what the union can win in negotiations. Before these meetings,
the negotiating committee will solicit demands from union members, either
directly through meetings called to discuss the upcoming negotiations or through
polls. In the UAW, for example, elected representatives from the local unions
meet in a convention and vote on bargaining resolutions during preparations for
companywide bargaining. The UAW leadership also consults union members
during the negotiation of plant contracts that supplement the companywide
agreements.
A union negotiating committee typically also receives information and
advice from the national union ’ s research staff during its preparations for
bargaining. The information provided frequently covers the fi nancial perfor-
mance of the company, forecasts the future performance of the company and
the economy, and summarizes recent settlements in other unions or the pay
improvements unorganized workers in the same city, fi rm, or industry have
received.
Some unions, such as the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), do extensive
research and analysis of economic developments in their industry and of the
fi nancial situation of each company. Prior to entering negotiations, the ALPA
research staff conducts extensive briefi ngs with the bargaining committee of an
airline and in some cases, such as at Continental Airlines, meets with company
representatives to compare fi nancial data and analysis. It is not uncommon for
union and company research staff to share information with each other if for no
other reason than to avoid debates over some of the basic facts each side needs
to prepare their team for negotiations.
Many unions now use surveys, focus groups, and/or direct interviews with
rank-and-fi le members to gather information about their concerns and their priorities
for negotiations. This serves as a two-way communications process. It both provides
data on the priorities of rank-and-fi le members and begins to engage the rank
and fi le in the negotiations process by informing them of some of the issues that
may come up.
Acquisition of Strike Authorization If an Impasse
Is Reached
If the union comes to an impasse with management during the negotiations and
is considering going on strike over unresolved disputes, two steps occur. In local
contract negotiations, the union ’ s constitution typically requires the local to seek
strike authorization from the national union. Strike approval is an important
process because, among other things, it enables striking workers to receive strike
benefi ts from the national union ’ s strike fund.
A union considering a strike will also typically poll its members. The strike
vote serves a dual purpose: it tells the union leadership whether the union ’ s
members support such an action and it helps rally the workers around the purpose
of the strike.
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Diane Frey
206 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations
Contract Ratifi cation
When an agreement is reached between the union ’ s negotiating committee and
management ’ s representatives, the union proceeds through its contract ratifi cation
procedures. Here there is much variation in the exact procedures unions use.
The fi rst step some unions take is to send a proposed agreement to a council
made up of lower-level union offi cers. This council includes local union offi cers
when a companywide agreement is negotiated (as in the steel and auto industries).
Union constitutions typically also require that the workers covered by a negotiated
agreement vote on any proposed settlement.
There are some notable exceptions to the normal pattern of union members
voting on proposed contracts. But in the usual case, workers must approve contract
settlements, often by majority vote. This sort of voting is an example of participatory
democracy in this critical aspect of union decision making.
The Role of Union Leaders in Shaping Strategies
The actual bargaining demands of unions refl ect more than just an averaging of
their members’ preferences. Several factors combine to produce the complex
process by which union leaders arrive at their bargaining objectives.
First, in addition to considering the preferences of their members, union leaders
must evaluate how likely it is that objectives can be attained. Unrealistic goals
must be discarded during pre-negotiation planning sessions or early on in
negotiations.
Second, union leaders must take into account the varying political infl uence
of subgroups within the union. Older or more skilled workers, for example, may
be more politically infl uential than other members. Thus, the objectives leaders
ultimately select may refl ect some workers’ goals more than others.
Third, union leaders must also be concerned about the long-term survival of
the union and must take steps to preserve those interests. However, there is always
the risk that union leaders will emphasize union security at the expense of
member preferences.
Finally, a central job for union leaders, like all leaders, is to lead! Union leaders
must weigh strategic options, make decisions, and secure the ongoing support of
their members for the decisions they make.
One of the keys to union leadership is effective internal communication. Union
leaders need regular upward communication from the rank and fi le and from
local union offi cers. Effective union leadership also requires that decision makers
communicate their activities and decisions back to the members. Unions use such
techniques as opinion surveys, satellite hookups, television advertising, and the
Internet to communicate with their members. Indeed, the Internet is becoming
a key resource in bargaining today. Union leaders are learning that they must
develop the skill to use this tool to communicate with members, for it is certain
that rival groups in the union will have those skills. In one case, ALPA found
that the tentative wage agreement it had reached with Delta Airlines was criticized
on a rival group ’ s website before the union team could even describe its terms
to union members! Thus, the means of communication in unions and the role
This content downloaded from 130.212.18.96 on Tue, 19 Jun 2018 14:02:03 UTC
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Diane Frey
Diane Frey
The Negotiations Process and Strikes 207
of communications in negotiations in general are changing rapidly in the age of
the Internet.
THE CYCLE OF TRADITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
Negotiations often proceed through a cycle in which the four subprocesses of
bargaining emerge and interrelate. 8 A typical cycle for a traditional negotiations
process is described below.
The Early Stages
In the initial stage of a traditional negotiation, the parties present their opening
proposals. This stage often involves a larger number of people than will be involved
in the negotiations of the fi nal agreement. The union, for example, may bring
in representatives from various interest groups and several levels of the union
hierarchy. These people participate in developing the initial proposals and later
become involved in securing ratifi cation of any agreement. The involvement of
all these different representatives can smooth the process of intraorganizational
bargaining in the union.
The union then presents proposals that cover the entire range of its concerns.
Some of the proposals will be of critical importance and will be at the heart of
the discussions as the strike deadline approaches. Some are important but may
be traded off at the last minute. Some may be translated into more specifi c
demands at a later stage of bargaining or may be issues to which the union will
assign a high priority in some future round of negotiations. Other issues are of
low priority and will be dropped as negotiations proceed into the serious decision-
making stages.
The Presentation of a Laundry List
The union ’ s presentation of a laundry list of issues serves several purposes. It
allows union leaders to recognize different interest groups by at least mentioning
their proposals. Some unrealistic demands will be aired, the problems underlying
these demands can be explored, and the employer can then reject these demands.
This process takes the pressure off union offi cers who might otherwise appear to
have arbitrarily nixed some group ’ s pet proposal. In a laundry list, either side also
could introduce issues that it hopes will be pursued in future negotiations.
Presenting a long list of proposals and infl ated demands as a fi rst step might
also be a useful way to camoufl age the real priorities of the union. Or a long list
of proposals could be helpful in integrative bargaining by facilitating trades across
issues.
Behavior of the Employer in the Early Phase
The behavior of employers at the outset of bargaining varies considerably. Some
employers will present a set of proposals to counterbalance the union demands.
Other employers will receive the union demands and promise a response at a
future negotiating session. Many management representatives prefer to delay
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Diane Frey
Diane Frey
**TurningtheTablesText.pdf**
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– 1
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